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Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing
Reform
MICHAEL TONRY

Sentencing reform has been on federal and state policy agendas since the
early 1970s, but since then the political challenges confronting policymakers
have changed little: overcoming the hostility of judges who resent perceived
intrusions on their authority and autonomy, resisting demagogic political
proposals for penalties that are unjustly and unaffordably severe, and educating
legislators and others about the practical limits of affordable policy options.
Although cynical politics and "three strikes and you're out" proposals
distort sentencing policy debates in the 1990s, they camouflage perceptible
progress at overcoming the other political problems. Judges in many jurisdictions have come to accept the desirability of presumptive standards for
sentencing and, behind the headlines, legislators in many states have accepted
the need to couple sentencing policy with corrections resources. As a result, in
many jurisdictions there is perceptible progress toward making sentencing
fairer, holding judges accountable for their decisions, and creating realistic and
affordable policies.
Detailed sentencing policies increasingly are set by sentencing commissions,
administrative agencies to which legislators have delegated authority for policy
formulation within statutory constraints and subject to legislative ratification
or rejection. The first commission was created in Minnesota in 19781 and
nearly twenty states now have or have had commissions.2 Those who believe
in incremental but demonstrable progress in the quality of government operations and in the sophistication of government policies have reasons to be
heartened by the sentencing commission story. The earliest commissions had to
survive and to demonstrate that they could develop and implement credible
sentencing policies. Some, in Connecticut, Maine, South Carolina, and New

Michael Tonry is the Marvin Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of Minnesota. This Article is based on a chapter in his forthcoming book, Sentencing
Matters (Oxford, 1996). @1995 by Michael Tonry. All rights reserved
1. Michael Toary, The Success of Judge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 U Colo
L Rev 713, 717 (1993).
2. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 Judicature
173, 174 (1995).
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York, did not survive. Others, in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington,
3
survived and devised credible sentencing policies.
Agencies concerned with survival and with management of controversial
changes in government operations cannot do everything at once. Minnesota's
commission, for example, had statutory authority to establish guidelines for
felonies and for misdemeanors and to create presumptions governing the use
of incarcerative and nonincarcerative sentences. 4 The commission developed
guidelines only for felonies and created presumptions concerning which
offenders should be sent to prison and for how long. Misdemeanor sentencing
was unaffected and judges retained complete and nonreviewable discretion over
the use of penalties other than state imprisonment (including jail terms up to
twelve months and all nonincarcerative penalties).'
Since then, successive commissions have marched through a series of policy
challenges. Minnesota and Washington established a "resource constraint"-a
policy specifying that the projected effects of sentencing standards be compatible with available and planned prison resources. 6 Most new commissions
have adopted a similar policy.
Pennsylvania's sentencing commission moved beyond Minnesota's and
developed guidelines for felonies and misdemeanors. 7 Most more recent
commissions have done likewise. Similarly, as time has passed, newer commissions have fine-tuned their policies about such things as handling of juvenile
adjudications, adjusting the weight of prior records to vary with the seriousness of previous crimes and the nature of current ones, and scaling the
seriousness of crimes.
Until recently, however, little progress has been made on two major facets
of sentencing policy: plea bargaining and nonincarcerative sanctions. Little need
be said concerning plea bargaining. It has been clear since the earliest days of
sentencing guidelines that rules that make judges' decisions more predictable
potentially increase the importance of plea bargaining.! If guidelines set a
presumed sentence for every possible combination of current offense and
criminal record, counsel can determine the applicable presumptive sentence by
deciding what charges to file or dismiss. A small literature accumulated in the
1970s and early 1980s on proposals for regulating plea bargaining in a
guidelines jurisdiction,' but only one body, the U.S. Sentencing Commission,

3. Tonry, 64 U Colo L Rev at 718-20 (cited in note 1); Michael Tonry, Failure of
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 39 Crime & Delinq 131 (1993).
4. Minn Stat Ann 5 244.09-5 (West 1992).
5. Id 5 244-1(4), II(D) (Appendix).
6. Tonry, 64 U Colo L Rev at 719 (cited in note 1).
7. Frase, 78 Judicature at 174 tbl 1 (cited in note 2).
8. Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 Hastings Ctr Rep
13 (Dec 1976).
9. See generally Don M. Gottfredson, Leslie T. Wilkins, and Peter B. Hoffman,
Guidelines for Parole and Sentencing (Lexington, 1978); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing
Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U Pa L Rev 550 (1978); Michael Tonry and John C. Coffee,
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has tried to do so. A system of "real offense sentencing" in which, regardless
of the offenses with which the defendant was charged or convicted, judges
apply the guidelines to their assessment of what really happened, using a civil
law balance-of-probabilities evidentiary standard, was adopted by the federal
commission-with disastrous results." The real offense system is widely disparaged as unjust and unethical-particularly in its effective nullification of the
rules of evidence, the criminal law's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of
proof, and the significance of acquittals. As a result, plea bargaining lawyers-often with tacit judicial approval-disingenuously circumvent the guidelines in a third or more of cases."
Concerning the other major unfinished business, incorporation of
nonincarcerative sanctions into sentencing policy, progress is being made." In
1994, newly adopted guidelines took effect in North Carolina that cover
felonies and misdemeanors and that structure judges' discretion concerning all
possible sentences." Also in 1994, and to achieve the same goals,
Pennsylvania's commission fundamentally overhauled a system of guidelines
that had been in effect since 1980."4
These policies were adopted, and similar policies were considered elsewhere, for three reasons. First, a system of sentencing guidelines that encompasses only prison sentences is fundamentally incomplete. In Minnesota, for
example, only 20 percent of felons are sentenced to state prisons. Second,
if justice requires that punishments be scaled to the severity of crimes, there is
a stark discontinuity in a system that contains no presumed applicable sanctions between prison and probation. 6 Third, fifteen years of experimentation
with intermediate sanctions instructs that judges often use them for less serious
offenders than those for whom the sanctions are designed; guidelines offer a

Jr., Enforcing Sentencing Guidelines: Plea Bargainingand Review Mechanisms, in Andrew
von Hirsch, Kay A. Knapp, and Michael Tonry, eds, The Sentencing Commission and Its
Guidelines 142 (Northeastern, 1987).
10. Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L Rev 1179 (1993); Kevin
R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 Stan L Rev 523
(1993); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 Minn L Rev 403 (1993).
11. See, for example, Ilene H. Nagel and Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three
Cities: An Empirical Study of Chargingand Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S Cal L Rev 501 (1992).
12. Most of the American and European intermediate sanctions research mentioned in

this Article is discussed in detail in Michael Tonry and Kate Hamilton, Intermediate
Sanctions in Overcrowded Times (Northeastern, 1995).
13. North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Committee, Revised Summary of
New Sentencing Laws and the State-County Criminal Justice PartnershipAct (1994); NC

Gen Stat § 15A-1340.
14. Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation
Manual (4th ed 1994).
15. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Report to the Legislature (1994).
16. Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate
Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System 1-8 (Oxford, 1990).
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mechanism for assuring that such sanctions are more often applied to appropriate offenders.' 7
This Article explores recent experience and evaluation research concerning
intermediate sanctions. Section I describes the burgeoning of intermediate
sanctions since 1980 and summarizes the findings of evaluation research
concerning the use and effects of such programs. Section II gives an overview
of problems that impede achievement of their primary goals-reductions in
recidivism, costs, and prison use. Section III discusses the sentencing policy
approaches now in use for establishing and implementing intermediate sanctions as part of a scaled continuum of sanctions in a rational sentencing
system.
I. The Development of Intermediate Sanctions
Three major developments in the 1960s and 1970s led to the perceived
need in the 1980s and 1990s to develop intermediate sanctions that fall
between prison and probation in their severity and intrusiveness. First, initially
on the basis of doubts about the ethical justification of rehabilitative correctional programs, 8 and later on the basis of doubts about their effectiveness, 19 rehabilitation lost credibility as a basis for sentencing. With it went the
primary rationale for individualized sentences.
Second, initially in academic circles2 ° and later in the minds of many
practitioners and policymakers, "just deserts" entered the penal lexicon, filled
the void left by rehabilitation, and came to be seen as the primary rationale
for sentencing. With it came a logic of punishments scaled in their severity so
as to be proportionate to the seriousness of crimes committed and a movement
to narrow officials' discretion by eliminating parole release, eliminating or limiting time off for good behavior, and constraining judges' discretion by use of
sentencing guidelines and mandatory penalties.21
Third, beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, crime control
policy became a staple issue in election campaigns and proponents of "law and
order" persistently called for harsher penalties. With this came a widespread
belief that most sentences to ordinary probation are insufficiently punitive and
substantial political pressure to increase the severity of punishments. Because,
however, most states lack sanctions other than prison that are widely seen as

17. Id at 9-32.
18. Francis A. Allen, The Borderline of Criminal Justice 25-41 (Chicago, 1964).
19. Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies (Praeger, 1975); S. R. Brody,
The Effectiveness of Sentencing: A Review of the Literature (H. M. Stationery, 1976); Lee
Sechrest, Susan 0. White, and Elizabeth D. Brown, eds, Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Perspectives (Natl Acad Sci, 1979).
20. Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago, 1974); Andrew von Hirsch,
Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (Northeastern, 1976).

21. American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice (Hill & Wang, 1971); von
Hirsch, Doing Justice (cited in note 20).

1995]

Intermediate Sanctions 395

meaningful, credible, and punitive, pressure for increased severity has been
satisfied mostly by increases in the use of imprisonment.
These developments resulted in a quadrupling in the number of state and
federal prisoners between 1975' and mid-19942 and in substantial overcrowding of American prisons. At year-end 1993, the federal prisons were
operating at 136 percent of rated capacity and thirty-nine state systems were
operating above rated capacity.2 4 An additional fifty-one thousand state
prisoners in twenty-two jurisdictions were being held in county jails because
prison space was unavailableY
Whatever the political and policy goals that vastly increased numbers of
prisoners may have satisfied, they have also posed substantial problems for
state officials. Prisons cost a great deal to build and to operate, and these costs
have not been lightly borne by hard-pressed state budgets in the recessionary
years of the early 1990s. In 1994, corrections budgets were the fastest rising
component of state spending. 6 However, the failure to deal with overcrowding led prisoners to file unconstitutional conditions suits in federal courts, and
throughout the 1990s as many as forty states have been subject to federal
court orders related to overcrowding.
Intermediate sanctions have been seen as a way both to reduce the need
for prison beds and to provide a continuum of sanctions that satisfies the just
deserts concern for proportionality in punishment. During the mid-1980s,
intermediate sanctions such as intensive supervision, house arrest, and electronic monitoring were oversold as being able simultaneously to divert offenders
from incarceration, reduce recidivism rates, and save money while providing
credible punishments that could be scaled in intensity to be proportionate to
the severity of the offender's crime. Like most propositions that seem too good
to be true, these were not.
During the past decade's experimentation, we have learned that some wellrun programs can achieve some of their goals, that some conventional goals
are incompatible, and that the availability of new sanctions presents almost
irresistible temptations to judges and corrections officials to use them for
offenders other than those for whom the programs were created.
The goals of diverting offenders from prison and providing tough, rigorously enforced sanctions in the community have proven largely incompatible.
A major problem, and one that has repeatedly been shown to characterize
intensive supervision programs, is that close surveillance of offenders reveals
higher levels of technical violations than are discovered in less intensive

22. In 1975, the prison population was 240,593. Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1993 210 tbl 343 (US Bureau of the Census, 113th ed 1993).
23. In mid-1994, the prison population was 1,012,851. US Department of Justice, State
and Federal Prison Population Tops One Million (Oct 27, 1994) (press release).
24. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prisoners in 1993 6 tbl 8 (US Dept of Just,
1994).
25. Id at 5.
26. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Budget Actions-1993 (1993).
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sanctions.27 Revocations for conduct constituting new crimes are seldom
higher for offenders in evaluated programs than for comparable offenders in
other programs. Nor is there reason to suppose that offenders in evaluated
new programs commit technical violations at higher rates. But if they do
breach a curfew or stop performing community service or get drunk or violate
a no-drug-use condition, the closer monitoring to which they are subject makes
the chances of discovery high; once the discovery is made, many program
operators believe they must take punitive action-typically revocation and
resentencing to prison-to maintain the program's credibility in the eyes of
judges, the media, and the community.
A second major lesson is that elected officials and practitioners often prefer
to use intermediate sanctions for types of offenders other than those for whom
programs were designed. Many evaluations of intensive supervision programs
and boot camps, for example, have shown that any realistic prospects of
saving money or prison beds require that they be used mostly for offenders
who otherwise would have served prison terms.28 Yet many elected officials
and practitioners resist acknowledging that persistent finding.
Elected officials resist because they are risk averse. Even in the best run
programs, offenders sometimes commit serious new crimes, and officials are
understandably concerned that they will be held responsible for supporting the
program. The Massachusetts furlough program for prisoners serving life
sentences from which Willy Horton absconded, for example, had been in
operation for fifteen years and was started under Republican Governor Francis
Sargent in 1971, but Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis was held politically accountable for Horton's 1986 rape of a Maryland woman.29 As a result
of this and similar incidents, elected officials often support new intermediate
sanctions but then take pains to limit eligibility to low-risk offenders. One
illustration is the series of recent federal proposals for boot camps for nonviolent first-time youthful offenders. Young non-violent first-offenders, however,
are among the least appropriate imaginable participants in boot camps if the
aims include cost savings and reduced demands on prison beds. Recent
evaluation research on boot camps concludes that they are likely to save
money and prison resources only if most of their inmates would otherwise
have served a lengthy prison sentence." Non-violent first offenders typically
are sentenced to probation or short jail terms and seldom are sentenced to
lengthy prison terms, and thus they are not generally appropriate candidates

27. Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner, Intensive Probation and Parole, 17 Crime & Just
281, 281 (1993).
28. Id at 287-90, 303, 308-10, 318; Dale G. Parent, Boot Camps Failing to Achieve
Goals, 5 Overcrowded Times 8 (Aug 1994).
29. Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in America (Oxford,
1995).
30. Doris Layton MacKenzie, Boot Camps: A National Assessment, 5 Overcrowded
Times 1, 17 (Aug 1994); Parent, 5 Overcrowded Times at 8-10 (Aug 1994) (cited in note
28).
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for boot camps.
Practitioners, particularly prosecutors and judges, also often resist using
intermediate sanctions for the offenders for whom they were designed. In part,
this is because they too are reluctant to be seen as responsible for crimes
committed by participants. This is why, as documented by evaluations of
intensive supervision probation programs,3 judges are often unwilling to
cooperate in projects in which-as part of experimental evaluations-target
categories of offenders are to be randomly assigned to a community penalty or
incarceration.
In part, judges' "misuse" of intermediate sanctions occurs because they
often believe new community penalties are more appropriate for some offenders than either prison or probation. Forced by limited program options to
choose between prison and probation, they will often choose probation because
prison is seen as too severe or too disruptive of the offender's and his family's
lives, albeit with misgivings because they believe ordinary probation too slight
a sanction. Once house arrest or intensive supervision becomes available, those
penalties may appear more appropriate than either probation or prison.
This not uncommon pattern, where judges use intermediate sanctions for
offenders other than those program planners had in mind, is often pejoratively
characterized as "net widening." That epithet oversimplifies the problem. From
the perspectives of the desirability of proportionality in punishment and of
availability of a continuum of sanctions, the judges' preference to divert
offenders from probation to something more intrusive is understandable,
perhaps admirable. From the perspective, however, of the designers of a
program intended to save money and prison space by diverting offenders from
prison, the judges' actions defy the program's rationale and obstruct achievement of its goals.
Probably the most important lesson learned from fifteen years' experience
with intermediate sanctions is that they are seldom likely to achieve their goals
unless means can be found to set and enforce policies governing their use.
Otherwise, the combination of officials' risk aversion and practitioners'
preferences to be guided solely by their own judgments about appropriate
penalties in individual cases will likely undermine program goals.
Means must be found to establish policies governing the choice of sanction
in individual cases. Two complementary means are available. First, discretion
to select sanctions can be shifted from judges and prosecutors to corrections
officials. "Back-end" programs to which offenders are diverted from prison by
corrections officials, or released early, have been much more successful at
saving money and prison space than have "front-end" programs. Similarly,
parole guidelines have been much more successful and less controversial in
reducing parole release disparities than sentencing guidelines have been in
reducing sentencing disparities."2 Presumably these findings occur because

31. Petersilia and Turner, 17 Crime & Just at 305, 326-28 (cited in note 27).
32. Arthur D. Little, Inc., An Evaluation of Parole Guidelines in Four Jurisdictions
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decision processes in bureaucracies can be placed in fewer hands and can be
more readily regularized by use of management controls than can decisions of
autonomous, politically selected judges.
Second, sentencing guidelines, which in many jurisdictions have succeeded
in reducing disparities in who goes to prison and for how long,3 3 can be
extended to govern choices among intermediate sanctions and between them
and prison and probation. Some states have made tentative steps in this
direction and many are considering doing so.
II. General Impediments to Effective Intermediate Sanctions
In retrospect it was naive (albeit well-intentioned) for promoters of new
intermediate sanctions to assure skeptics that recidivism rates would fall, costs
would decline, and pressure on prison beds would diminish if new programs
were established. 34 The considerable pressures for net widening and the
formidable management problems involved in implementing new programs
interact in complex ways. Although these challenges are now well-understood,
that knowledge has been hard won.
A.

RECIDIVISM

Consider first recidivism rates. From influential evaluations of community
service,'3 intensive supervision, 36 and boot camps, 37 to mention only a few,
comes a robust finding that recidivism rates (for new crimes) of offenders
sentenced to well-managed intermediate sanctions do not differ significantly from
those of comparable offenders receiving other sentences. Recidivism and revocation rates for violation of other conditions, by contrast, are generally higher.
From different perspectives, both findings may be seen as good or bad. The
finding of no effect on rates of new crime may be seen by many as good if the
offenders involved have been diverted from prison and the new crimes they commit are not very serious. Sentences to prison are much more expensive to
administer than sentences to house arrest, intensive supervision, or day reporting
centers, and if the latter are no less effective at reducing subsequent criminality,
they can potentially provide nearly comparable public safety at greatly reduced

(1981) (unpublished report available through the National Institute of Corrections or the
National Criminal Justice Research Service); Alfred Blumstein, et al, eds, 1 Research on
Sentencing: The Search for Reform 28-31, 126-32 (Natl Acad, 1983).

33. Tonry, 39 Crime & Delinq 131 (cited in note 3); Tonry, 64 U Colo L Rev 713
(cited in note 1).
34. James M. Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio, and Joan Petersilia, eds, Smart Sentencing: The
Emergence of Intermediate Sanctions xiv (Sage, 1992).
35. Douglas Corry McDonald, Punishment without Walls: Community Service Sentences
in New York City (Rutgers, 1986).
36. Petersilia and Turner, 17 Crime & Just 281 (cited in note 27).
37. Doris Layton MacKenzie and Claire Souryal, Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration (Natl Inst Just, 1994).
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cost.

But not "comparable public safety": by definition, crimes committed in the
community by people who would have been in prison would not otherwise have
occurred. Thus, if diverted intermediate sanction participants commonly commit
violent or sexual crimes, "no difference in recidivism rates" provides little solace.
If, however, participants seldom commit violent or sexual crimes, the open-eyed
choice that must be made is between a few avoidable serious crimes and many
avoidable minor crimes, and substantial costs to hold people in prison. The
option of holding every offender until he will no longer offend is impracticable,
even if it were just. Property offenders particularly have high reoffending rates;
more than 30 percent of American and English males are arrested for nontrivial
crimes by age thirty, and all offenders cannot be confined forever.3 1 In effect,
this trade between costs and allowing avoidable crimes to happen is made
whenever community sentencing programs are established.
From the other side of the punishment continuum, the no-effect-on-newcrimes finding raises different issues. If ordinary probation is no less effective at
preventing new crimes than is a new intermediate sanction at ten times the
average cost per offender, the case for sentencing offenders to the new program
instead of probation cannot be made on cost-effectiveness terms. That does not
mean that no case can be made; Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner, among others,
have offered the just deserts argument for intermediate sanctions: they can
deliver a punishment that is more intrusive and burdensome than probation and
more appropriately proportioned to the offender's guilt.39 This is a plausible
argument, but it shifts the rationale from utilitarian claims about crime and cost
reductions to normative claims about the quality of justice.
The equally robust finding that participants in intermediate sanctions
typically have higher rates of violation of technical conditions than comparable
offenders otherwise punished provokes a not-quite-parallel set of concerns. Most
observers agree that the raised violation (and related raised revocation) rates
result from the greater likelihood that violations will be discovered in intensive
programs, and not from greater underlying rates of violation. From the perspective that "the law must keep its promises," the higher failure rates are good.
Offenders should comply with conditions, and consequences should attach when
they do not.
The contrary view is that the higher failure rates expose the unreality and
injustice of conditions-like prohibitions on drinking or drug use or expectations
that offenders will conform to middle-class behavioral standards they have never
observed before-that many offenders will foreseeably breach and that do not
involve victimization of others. Many offenders have great difficulty in achieving
conventional, law-abiding patterns of living and many will stumble along the
way; a traditional social work approach to community corrections would expect

38. See, for example, Christy Ann Visher, et al, Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals", (Nail Acad, 1986).
39. Petersilia and Turner, 17 Crime & Just 281 (cited in note 27).
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and accept the stumbles (so long as they do not involve serious new crimes) and
hope that through them, with help, the offender will learn to be law-abiding.
From this perspective, it is an advantage of low-intensity programs that they
uncover few violations and a disadvantage of high-intensity programs that they
uncover more.
Thus the evaluation findings on recidivism and revocation rates elicit
different reactions from different people in light of different conceptions of how
the corrections system ought to work. In addition, however, they illuminate a
major impediment to aspirations to reduce prison use by means of establishment
of intermediate sanctions.
B. PRISON BEDS

If all offenders in a community program were diverted from long prison
terms, a 30 percent revocation rate for technical violations (whatever the rate for
new-crime violations, but here assuming 20 percent) would not be an insurmountable problem. The net savings in prison beds would be the number of
persons diverted from prison multiplied by the average time they would otherwise spend in prison less the number of persons revoked for violations multiplied
by their average term to be served. Unless the gross revocation rate approached
100 percent, or the average time to be served after revocation exceeded the
average time that would have been served if not diverted, bed savings are inevitable.
The combination of net widening and elevated rates of technical violations
and revocations makes the calculation harder and makes prison bed savings
difficult to achieve. For front-end programs, a 50 percent rate of prison diversion
is commonly counted a success. Consider how the numbers work out. The 50
percent diverted from prison save prison beds, on the calculation and assumptions described in the preceding paragraph. The 50 percent diverted from
probation are a different story. They would not otherwise have occupied prison
beds, and if half (on the assumption that the revocation rate is 30 percent for
technical violations and 20 percent for new crimes) suffer revocation and
imprisonment, they represent new demand for beds, and a higher demand than
would otherwise exist because many more of their technical violations will be
discovered and acted upon.
Whether a particular program characterized by 50 percent prison diversion
will save or consume net prison beds depends on why offenders' participation is
revoked and in what percentage of cases, and whether they are then sent to
prison and for how long. But 50 percent is a high assumed prison diversion rate.
If the true rate is 30 percent or 20 percent, net prison bed savings are unlikely.
C. COST SAVINGS

The third often-claimed goal of intermediate sanctions is to save money.
Interaction of all the preceding difficulties makes dollar savings unlikely except
in the best of cases. If a majority of participants in a program are diverted from
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probation rather than from prison, and if technical violation and revocation rates
are higher in the intermediate sanction than in the ordinary probation and parole
programs to which offenders would otherwise be assigned, the chances of net
cost savings are slight. For boot camps, for example, assuming typical levels of
participant non-completion and typical levels of post-program revocation, Dale
Parent has calculated that "the probability of imprisonment has to be around 80
percent just to reach a break-even point-that is, to have a net impact of zero on
prison bedspace."4 °
Cost analyses must, however, look beyond diversion rates, revocation rates,
and prison beds. At least three other considerations are important. First is the
issue of transaction costs. Net-widening programs that shift probationers to
intensive supervision and then shift some of those to prison cost the state more
because they use up additional prison space. But in addition, these programs
create new expenses for probation offices, prosecutors, courts, and corrections
agencies administering each of those transfers. Correctional cost-benefit analyses
often ignore cost ramifications for other agencies, but the other agencies must
either pay additional costs or refuse to cooperate. For example, community
corrections officials often complain that courts sometimes do not take violations
seriously and that, when they do, police assign such low priority to execution of
arrest warrants for program violators that they are in effect meaningless. 4
Second is the problem of marginal costs. Especially in the 1980s, promoters
of new programs commonly contrasted the average annual costs per offender of
administering a new program (say $4,500) with the average annual cost of
housing one prisoner (say $18,500) and claimed substantial potential cost
savings.4 ' This ignores the complexities presented by net widening and raised
revocation rates; it also ignores a more important problem of scale.
For an innovative small program of fifty to one hundred offenders (and
many were and are of this size or smaller), the valid comparison is with the
marginal, not the average, costs of housing diverted offenders. Unless a prison or
a housing unit will be closed or not opened because the system has fifty fewer
inmates, the only savings will be marginal costs for food, laundry, supplies, and
other routine items. The major costs of payroll, administration, debt service, and
maintenance will be little affected. In a prison system with five thousand, fifteen
thousand, or fifty thousand inmates, the marginal costs saved by diverting a few
hundred are scarcely noticeable.
Third is the issue of savings to the larger community associated with crimes
avoided by incapacitating offenders. If believable values could be attached to
crimes that would be averted by imprisonment but that would occur if offenders
were assigned to community penalties, they would provide important data for

40. Parent, 5 Overcrowded Times at 9 (Aug 1994) (cited in note 28).
41. See McDonald, Punishment without Walls (cited in note 35).
42. See, for example, Billie Erwin, Evaluation of Intensive Probation Supervision in
Georgia (Ga Dept of Corrections, 1987); Billie Erwin and Lawrence Bennett, New
Dimensions in Probation:Georgia's Experience with Intensive Probation Supervision (Nad
Inst Just, 1987).
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considering policy options. Unfortunately, this subject has as yet received little
sustained attention and has generated few believable findings. Some conservative
writers have claimed that increased use of imprisonment is highly costeffective.43 Kleiman and Cavanagh, for example, estimated "benefits of incarcer4
ating that one inmate for a year at between $172,000 and $2,364,000."
Liberal scholars have responded by showing the implausibility of many of
the assumptions made in such calculations. Zimring and Hawkins, for example,
showed that, on the assumptions made in Zedlewski's analysis about the number
of crimes prevented for each inmate confined, the 237,000 increase in the prison
population that occurred between 1977 and 1986 should have "reduce[d] crime
to zero on incapacitation effects alone .... [Oln this account, crime disappeared
some years ago. . . ."" That is true of all the cost-benefit analyses mentioned in
the preceding paragraph. If their assumptions about the number of crimes
prevented by confining offenders are correct and are used to calculate the
number of crimes prevented since prison populations began in 1975 to quadruple, we should have been living in a crime-free society since the mid-1980s.
One of the conservative contributors to this debate later recanted more
extreme claims and concluded that "the truth, we find, lies ... arguably closer
to the liberal than to the conservative view."46 These debates have, however,
been more ideological than scientific and offer little guidance for thinking about
intermediate sanctions. What is left is the need mentioned earlier to weigh the
kinds of risks particular offenders present with the costs that will be incurred if
alternate sanctioning choices are made.
No one who has worked with the criminal justice system should be surprised
by the observation that the system is complex and that economic and policy
ramifications ripple through it when changes are made in any one of its parts.
Sometimes that truism has been overlooked to the detriment of programs on
behalf of which oversimplified claims were made. Georgia, for example, operated
a pioneering front-end intensive supervision program (ISP) that was at one time
claimed to have achieved remarkably low recidivism rates (for new crimes) and
to have saved Georgia the cost of building two prisons.47 It was later realized
that many or most of those sentenced to ISP were low-risk offenders convicted
of minor crimes who otherwise would have received probation. From serving

43. See, for example, Edwin W. Zedlewski, Making Confinement Decisions (Nati Inst
Just, 1987); John J. DiIulio, Crime and Punishment in Wisconsin, 3 Wis Policy Research
Inst Rep 1 (1990); John J. DiIulio and Anne M. Piehl, Does Prison Pay? (1991) (unpub-

lished manuscript on file with author); William Barr, The Case for More Incarceration (US
Dept Just, Office of Policy Development, 1992).
44. Mark A. Kleiman and David Cavanagh, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Prison Cell
Construction and Alternative Sanctions (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)

(emphasis in original).
45. Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment 97
(Chicago, 1991).
46. Dilulio and Piehl, Does Prison Pay? (cited in note 43).
47. Erwin, Intensive Probation Supervision in Georgia (cited in note 42); Erwin and

Bennett, New Dimensions in Probation (cited in note 42).
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initially as an exemplar of successful ISP programs that save money and reduce
recidivism rates, Georgia's ISP program now serves as an exemplar of net-widening programs that increase system costs and produce higher rates of revocation
for violation of technical conditions.48
III. Is There a Future for Intermediate Sanctions?
Despite the seemingly disheartening evaluation findings that suggest that
most intermediate sanctions do not reduce recidivism, corrections costs, and
prison crowding while simultaneously enhancing public safety, there is a future
for intermediate sanctions.
There is a need to develop credible, enforceable sanctions between prison
and probation that can provide appropriate deserved penalties for offenders
convicted of mid-level crimes, and numerous studies document the capacity of
well-managed corrections departments to implement such programs. There is a
need, for their sake and ours, to help offenders establish conventional, lawabiding patterns of living, and the evaluation literature suggests ways that can be
facilitated. There is a need to develop intermediate sanctions that can serve as
cost-effective substitutes for confinement, and the evaluation literature suggests
how that can be done. Finally, there is a need to devise ways to assure that
intermediate sanctions are used for the kinds of offenders for whom particular
programs were created, and experience with parole and sentencing guidelines
shows how that can be done.
Three major obstacles stand in the way. The first, and most difficult, is the
modern American preoccupation with absolute severity of punishment and the
related widespread view that only imprisonment counts. The average lengths of
prison sentences are much greater in the United States than in other Western
countries. 49 The ten-, twenty-, and thirty-year minimum sentences that are in
vogue for drug crimes are unimaginable in most countries. Despite a trebling in
the average severity of prison sentences for violent crimes between 1976 and
1989, s° and additional increases since 1989, federal crime legislation passed in
1994 conditions prison construction grants to states on substantial additional
increases in sentences for violent offenders, using 1993 averages as a base.'
This absolute severity frustrates efforts to devise intermediate sanctions for
the psychological (not to mention political) reason that few other sanctions seem
commensurable with a multi-year prison sentence. Half or more offenders

48. Todd R. Clear and James M. Byrne, The Future of Intermediate Sanctions: Questions to Consider, in Byrne, Lurigio, and Petersilia, eds, Smart Sentencing at 319, 321
(cited in note 34).
49. Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect tbl 7-1 (cited in note 29).
50. This increase has been documented by the National Academy of Sciences Panel on
the Understanding and Control of Violence. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Jeffrey Roth, eds, 1
Understandingand Controlling Violence 1-3 (Natl Acad, 1993).
51. Scott Wallace, Crime Bill Offers Funds to States for Prisons, 5 Overcrowded Times
4, 12 (Oct 1994).
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convicted of serious crimes in Sweden, Germany, and England are sentenced to
fines. (The abandonment of unit fines in England did not result in a reduction in
52
use of fines, which continued to be imposed on a "tariff" fixed-amount basis.)
In European countries, the prison sentences avoided by use of fines would
have involved months or at most a few years, making a burdensome financial
penalty an imaginable alternative. By contrast, most of the American day fine
pilot projects would use day fines as punishments for misdemeanors or noncriminal ordinance violations or as a mid-level punishment between supervised and
unsupervised probation. 3 Likewise, with the rare exception of New York's
community service project started by the Vera Institute,54 community service
orders (CSOs) are generally ordered as probation conditions and not as sentences
in their own right.
Successful efforts have been made to replace prison sentences of six or fewer
months (moderately severe penalties in those countries) with day fines in Germany5" and with community service orders in the Netherlands.5 In Sweden,
however, less than a quarter of prison sentences are for terms of six months or
longer, 7 and in the Netherlands less than 15 percent are for terms of a year or
longer.5 8 Equivalent crimes in the United States would be punished by terms
measured in years; in 1991, 90 percent of state inmates were sentenced to terms
longer than one year and 57 percent to terms longer than five years."
Because the modern emphasis on absolute severity of punishments for crime
is the product of partisan and ideological politics, it will not readily be changed.
It does, however, stand in the way of substantial development of a continuum of
punishments in which moderately punitive and intrusive sanctions serve as penalties-in place of incarceration-for moderately severe crimes.
The second, not unrelated, obstacle to fuller development of intermediate
sanctions is widespread commitment to "just deserts" rationales for punishment
and the collateral idea that the severity of punishment should vary directly with
the seriousness of the crime.6" This has been translated in the federal and most

52. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters ch 4 (Oxford, 1996).
53. See, for example, Susan Turner, Day-Fine Projects Launched in Four Jurisdictions,
3 Overcrowded Times 5, 6 (Dec 1992).
54. McDonald, Punishment without Walls (cited in note 35).
55. See Thomas Weigend, Germany Reduces Use of Prison Sentences, 3 Overcrowded
Times 1 (Apr 1992); Hans-Jorg Albrecht, Sentencing Reform in Germany, 6 Overcrowded
Times 1 (Feb 1995).
56. Peter Tak, Sentencing and Punishment in the Netherlands, 5 Overcrowded Times
5, 8 (Oct 1994); Sentencing in the Netherlands, 7 Acta Criminologica 7, 17 (1994); Peter
Tak, Adoption and Use of Community Service Orders in the Netherlands, 6 Overcrowded
Times 4, 12-13 (Apr 1995).
57. Nils Jareborg, The Swedish Sentencing Reform, in Chris Clarkson and Rod
Morgan, eds, The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Oxford, 1995).
58. Tak, 5 Overcrowded Times 5 (Oct 1994) (cited in note 56); Tak, 7 Act
Criminologica 7 (cited in note 56).
59. Allen Beck, et al, Survey of State Prison Inmates (Bureau of Just Stat, 1993).
60. von Hirsch, Doing Justice (cited in note 20).

1995]

IntermediateSanctions 405

state sentencing guidelines systems into policies that tie punishments to the
offender's crime and criminal history and little else.6'
Such policies and their commitment to "proportionality in punishment"
constitute a gross oversimplification of the cases that come before criminal
courts. Crimes that share a label can be very different; "robberies" range from
schoolyard takings of basketballs to gangland assaults on banks. Offenders
committing the same crime can be very different; a thief may have been motivated by a sudden impulse, by the need to feed a hungry child, by a craving to buy
drugs, or by a conscious choice to make a living as a supplier of stolen wares.
Punishments likewise vary. Despite a common label, two years' imprisonment can be served in a maximum security prison of fear and violence, in a
minimum security camp, at home under house arrest, or in some combination of
these and other regimes. Even a single punishment-confinement in Illinois's
Stateville Prison for three years-may be differently experienced; three years'
imprisonment may be a rite of passage for a young gang member, a death
sentence for a frail seventy year old, or the ruin of the lives of an employed
forty-year-old man and his dependent spouse and children.
Nonetheless, commitment to ideas of proportionality is widespread, and it
circumscribes the roles that intermediate sanctions can play. Although few
reasonable people would disagree with the empirical observations in the preceding paragraph, sentencing policies based on ideas of proportionality somehow
reify sentencing categories into something meaningful. If guidelines specify a
twenty-four-month prison term for offense x with criminal history y, it seems
unfair to sentence one offender to community service or house arrest when
another like-situated (in the narrow terms of the guidelines) is sentenced to
twenty-four months. It seems more unfair to sentence one offender subject to a
twenty-four-month guidelines sentence to house arrest when an offender convicted of a less serious crime receives an eighteen-month prison sentence.
Commitment to proportionality interacts with the modern penchant for
severe penalties. If crimes punished by months of incarceration in other countries
are punished by years in the United States, comparisons between offenders are
more stark. If in Sweden two offenses are ordinarily punished by thirty- and
sixty-day prison terms, imposition of a day fine order on the more serious
offender, out of consideration for the effects of a prison term on his family and
employment, produces a contrast between a thirty-day sentence and a sixty-unit
day fine. Convert the example to American presumptive sentences of two and
four years and the contrast is jarring between any intermediate sanction and a
two-year sentence for someone convicted of a less serious crime.
Net widening is the third obstacle to further development of intermediate
sanctions. As discussed earlier, there is a natural tension between practitioners
who make decisions in individual cases and want to achieve individualized justice
in each case, and policymakers who try to take a systemic perspective and want
officials' decisions to be standardized and predictable. In a jurisdiction that lacks

61. Tonry, Sentencing Matters ch 1 (cited in note 52).
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well-developed community penalties, it is understandable that judges and
prosecutors want to use newly available resources for what seem to them suitable
offenders. From the perspective of system planners, however, sentencing otherwise probation-bound offenders to a program intended for prison-bound offenders frustrates the purpose of the program.
There are two solutions to the net-widening problem. The first is to shift
control over program placements from judges to corrections officials wherever
possible. For some programs, such as boot camps and back-end forms of ISP and
house arrest, this is relatively easy and makes it likelier that such programs will
achieve their goals of saving money and prison space without increasing recidivism rates.
Transfers of authority to corrections officials can, however, at best be a
partial solution. No one (whom I know or can imagine) wants all sentencing
authority shifted into bureaucratic hands, and judges therefore will retain
authority to decide who will be sent to jail or prison. A slightly more plausible
alternative would be to limit judicial authority to the choice between prison and
probation and to allow probation and prison authorities to decide what other
sanction (such as house arrest, intensive supervision probation, or treatment
participation) should be applied either as probation conditions or as custodial
regimes.
Few people would want to place full authority over questions of confinement
in bureaucratic hands. After all, judges are concerned with questions of liberty
and justice, and most people would probably rest easier having judges make
threshold decisions about confinement. In addition, it is hard to imagine any role
for fines and community service in a sentencing system where judges lacked
authority to order such sentences.
The alternative is to structure judges' decisions about intermediate sanctions
by use of sentencing guidelines. A substantial body of evaluation and other
research demonstrates that well-conceived and implemented guidelines can
change sentencing patterns in a jurisdiction and achieve high levels of judicial
compliance (sometimes, as with the federal guidelines, grudging compliance).62
Most state guidelines systems, however, establish presumptions for who is
sent to state prisons and for how long, but do not set presumptions concerning
nonprison sentences or choices between prison and other sanctions. Two broad
approaches for setting guidelines for nonprison sentences have been tried.63
The first, which seems to have been a dead end, is to establish "punishment
units" in which all sanctions can be expressed.64 Thus, a year's confinement
might equal ten units, a month of house arrest three units, and a month's
community service two units. A twenty-unit sentence could be satisfied by any

62. Tonry, 39 Crime & Delinq 131 (cited in note 3); Tonry, 64 U Colo L Rev 713
(cited in note 1).
63. The literature is tiny. See Andrew von Hirsch, Martin Wasik, and Judith Greene,
Punishments in the Community and the Principles of Desert, 20 Rutgers L J 595 (1989);

Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and Probation (cited in note 16).
64. Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and Probation at 19-32 (cited in note 16).
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sanction or combination of sanctions equaling twenty. This idea was taken
furthest in Oregon, where sentencing guidelines, in addition to setting presumptive ranges for jail and prison sentences, specify a number of punishment units
for every crime/criminal history combination for which a state prison sentence is
not presumed appropriate. 65
Oregon's experience, however, illustrates the limits of such policies until
either America's penchant for severe punishment or the logic of just deserts loses
influence. Reference to experience with community service orders can demonstrate why that is so. In the Netherlands," England and Wales, 6 7 and Scotland,68 CSOs are intended to serve as nonincarcerative alternatives to prison
sentences of up to one year; in each country, 240 hours is regarded as the maximum feasible work obligation. This is because well-run programs place extensive
demands on staff time-finding suitable jobs, ensuring that offenders attend,
investigating reasons for non-attendance, taking action against persistent nonattenders-and 240 hours is seen as a practical limit of feasibility. Likewise, the
best-known and best-documented American CSO project, developed by New
York's Vera Institute, was designed to punish offenders who would otherwise
,receive a six-month jail term and required seventy hours of work, again for
69
practical reasons of administrative feasibility.
Although in theory Oregon's guidelines incorporate the punishment units
idea and authorize alternative uses of incarcerative and nonincarcerative penalties, in practice they do not. Oregon's guidelines are straightjacketed by just
deserts logic: imprisonment is the most punitive sanction, and any alternative
must be comparably restrictive and unpleasant. Thus, one day's custody in jail or
prison equals one day in house arrest or a restitution center or inpatient treatment, or equals twenty-four hours of community service or participation in a
work crew. The rationale for all the day-equals-a-day exchange rates is selfevident: in each case, the defendant is subject to around-the-clock controls on
movement. The rationale for the one-day-equals-twenty-four-hours exchanges is
presumably that a day's community service involves only eight hours and, to be
as burdensome as jail, which deprives liberty for twenty-four hours a day, can
count only as one-third day's confinement.
The practical effect of Oregon's policy is to limit "nonincarcerative sanctions" either to sanctions that are in substance confinement (house arrest,
inpatient treatment, etc.) or to crimes that are of trifling severity. The Vera
Institute's community service program (in lieu of six-month jail terms) in Oregon
could substitute only for three days' confinement. The 240-hour European

65. Oregon Criminal Justice Council, First Year Report on Implementation of Sentencing Guidelines (1991).
66. Tak, 6 Overcrowded Times 4 (Apr 1995) (cited in note 56).
67. Ken Pease, Community Service Orders, 6 Crime & Just (1985).
68. Gill Mclvor, Sentenced to Serve: The Operation and Impact of Community Service
by Offenders (Avebury, 1992); Gill McIvor, CSOs Succeed in Scotland, 4 Overcrowded
Times 1, 6-8 (June 1993).
69. McDonald, Punishment without Walls at 36-37 (cited in note 35).
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programs could replace ten days in jail. Thus, Oregon has not taken the punishment units idea very far. No jurisdiction has taken it further.
The overwhelming problem lies in the idea of proportionality mentioned
earlier and can be further illustrated by Washington State's more modest effort
at exchange rates.7" Partial confinement and community service were authorized
as substitutes for presumptive prison terms on the basis of one day's partial
confinement or three days' community service for one day of confinement. The
partial confinement/confinement exchange is probably workable for short
sentences (house arrest, if included as partial confinement, is seldom imposed for
more than a few months), but the community service exchange is not. The
difficulty is that community service programs must be enforced to be credible,
and experience in this country and elsewhere instructs that they must be short.
It is easy to criticize the Oregon Commission for not carrying its innovation
further and the Washington Commission for lack of imagination, but that would
be unfair. Working out exchange rates in a system predicated on strong ideas of
proportionality in punishment is very difficult, if not impossible. If punitive
literalism governs, the range for substitution between prison and community
penalties is tiny. A system like New York's community service program, seventy
hours' work in place of six months' jail, can be justified (the idea was to give
repetitive property offenders some meaningful enforced penalty rather than
impose a jail term that no one expected would have deterrent effects), but it
requires a loosening of proportionality constraints which no sentencing commission has yet been prepared to accept. Pennsylvania's commission in 1993 gave
serious consideration to a punishment unit system but abandoned it when the
problem of exchange rates proved insoluble.71 (There are other problems with
the punishment rate approach: inevitably the exchange rates are arbitrary; if
conditions like treatment participation, restitution, observance of curfews, drug
testing, and electronic monitoring are given unit values, comparisons between
offenders become even more implausible.)
The other approach is to establish different areas of a guidelines grid in
which different presumptions about choice of sentence govern. Both North
Carolina and Pennsylvania adopted such systems in 1994. Table 1 shows the
Pennsylvania grid (the North Carolina grid is similar in principle though it varies
in detail). The Pennsylvania grid scales offenses by seriousness along a vertical
axis and criminal histories by their extent along a horizontal axis. To this point,
the Pennsylvania grid is like every other state's. It differs in the four bands which
give judges discretion over the types of sentence that are presumed appropriate.
For cases falling in the top band, only prison sentences are deemed appropriate and the presumptive minimum terms before eligibility for parole release are
to be chosen from ranges indicated in the individual cells. A judge who imposes
a different kind of sentence or a different minimum must provide reasons for this

70. Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, A Decade of Sentencing
Reform: Washington and Its Guidelines, 1981-1991 (1992).
71. The author was involved in discussions of draft documents.
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departure, which the parties may appeal.
In the next band down, however, the judge may choose between
incarcerative sentences and "restrictive intermediate sanctions," which include
inpatient treatment programs and residential rehabilitation centers, as well as
halfway houses, house arrest, and intensive probation supervision. In the next
lower band, the judge may choose between intermediate sanctions and "restorative sanctions" (restitution, community service, fines, ordinary probation).
In the fourth and lowest band, the judge may choose only among restorative
sanctions.
A system much like Pennsylvania's was proposed by the District of Columbia
Superior Court Sentencing Commission in 1987 but never took effect.72 The
Pennsylvania and North Carolina systems took effect in the fall of 1994; how
they will work in practice remains to be seen. From a "just deserts" perspective,
they may be seen as steps backward. In the second band, Pennsylvania allows
judges to choose among a minimum prison sentence of up to twenty-one months
(for some cases), a period of unspecified duration in an inpatient drug treatment
program, and intensive supervision probation. Offenders who are "like" in the
categories of a guidelines grid may receive very different sentences.
Systems like Pennsylvania's and North Carolina's face at least two major
challenges. First, the American fondness for harsh sentences may lead judges (by
themselves or under pressure from prosecutors) to resist the guidelines' invitation
to substitute intermediate sanctions for jail and prison terms. Second, state and
county legislators may fail to appropriate the funds that are required to make
intermediate sanctions effective and credible. Even judges who in principle would
prefer to impose community penalties will not do so if credible, enforced
programs are unavailable. Judges may sentence moderately serious offenders to
a well-run house arrest or intensive supervision program but will seldom do so
if the ostensibly intensive program is simply underfunded, overworked probation
under a different name.
Readers, I hope, will draw at least four conclusions from this Article. First,
for offenders who do not present unacceptable risk of violence, well-managed
intermediate sanctions offer a cost-effective way to keep them in the community
at less cost than imprisonment and with no worse later prospects for criminality.
Second, boot camps, house arrest, and intensive supervision are highly
vulnerable to net widening when entry is controlled by judges. For boot camps,
the solution is easy: have corrections officials select participants from among
admitted prisoners. For house arrest and ISP, the solution is less easy: while
corrections officials can control entry to back-end programs, sentencing guidelines may be able to structure judges' decisions about admission to front-end
programs.
Third, front-end intermediate sanctions are unlikely to come into widespread

72. D.C. Superior Court, Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Initial Report of the
Superior Court Sentencing Guidelines Commission: The Development of Felony Sentencing
Guidelines (1987).
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use as prison alternatives unless sentencing theories and policies become more
expansive and move away from oversimplified ideas about proportionality in
punishment.
Fourth, there is no free lunch. Promised reductions in recidivism, cost, and
prison use as a result of creation of new intermediate sanctions were never
realistic, though for the most part they were offered in good faith. Intermediate
sanctions can reduce costs and divert offenders from imprisonment, but those
results are not easy to obtain.

